Standard auction mechanisms often break down in important e-commerce applications, where agents demand bundles of complementary resources, i.e. "I only want B if I also get A". This paper describes zBundle, an ascending-price auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with agents that follow a best-response bidding strategy. The auction prices bundles directly and allows agents to place additive or exclusive-or bids over collections of bundles. Empirical results confirm that iBundle generates efficient allocations for hard resource allocation problems. Furthermore, we show that iBundle generates solutions without complete revelation (or computation) of agent preferences.
INTRODUCTION
The popularity of Internet-based auctions continues to rise. Auctions are dynamic and often efficient mechanisms for selling items in complex marketplaces. Auctions are useful for sellers that are poorly informed about the value of items, for example collectibles and one-of-a-kind items ( 4 e. . www. ebay . corn, www .zauction. corn), and in markets for time-critical items, for example electronic components (e.g. www . f astparts . corn). In addition, auctions provide a foundation for mediation and brokering in automatic supplychain and procurement systems, as the trend towards disaggregation of services and products continues [2, 41. However, standard auction mechanisms can generate inefficient allocations of resources when agents demand ~WZ: dZes of complementary resources, Le. "I only want B if I also get A". This bundling problem has been identified in many problem domains, including auctions for take-off and landing slots at an airport [19] , distributed task-allocation problems [20] , and factory scheduling problems [24] . Similar problems occur in procurement when products have multiple attributes, e.g. quality, price, delivery time, and terms Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. E-COMMERCE 99, Denver, Colorado @1999 ACM l-58113-176-3/99/0011..$5.00 of payment [5] , and also in supply-chain problems where services from multiple suppliers need to be coordinated.
Auctions that price bundles as the sum price of the individual items (including sequential and simultaneous auctions) fail when there are no prices that support an efficient solution (the existence problem) and also when agents bid cautiously to avoid purchasing an incomplete bundle (the exposure problem) [8] . These problems were both identified in the recent FCC spectrum auction [12] . Although new contract types for task (or resource) re-allocation (e.g. swap, multilateral exchange, etc.) can support efficient allocations in a decentralized market [l] , in general, costs of negotiation and search become too high without a central auctioneer [5] .
Bundle auctions, that price bundles and allow agents to bid for bundles of items, can provide a solution to both the existence and exposure problems [8, 241 . Agents can use bundle bids to directly express contingent demands for items. However naive bundle auctions for G items quickly become informationally and computationally infeasible, with 2 iGl bundles to price and O(]G]lG1) possible allocations [13, 211. iBundle is the first ascending-price bundle auction that is guaranteed to compute optimal bundle allocations with a best-response agent bidding strategy. Moreover, we have proved [14] that the resulting prices correspond to a competitive equilibrium for the package assignment model [6] . The auction sells bundles for different prices to different agents (price discrimination), when this is necessary to support an optimal solution. Results from tests on hard resource allocation problems show that iBundle often generates solutions that are more efficient than current iterative auctions.
The auction has practical significance because it addresses the computational and informational complexity of bundle auctions. For agents, the auction can terminate before agents have revealed (or even computed) their values for every bundle. This can be important when agents have hard valuation problems [15, 161 . Furthermore, the auctioneer only needs to generate explicit prices on a subset of bundles and often solves smaller winner determination problems than in the classic sealed-bid bundle auction (the Generalized Vickrey Auction [23] ). Also relevant, because the winner determination problem remains NP-complete, is that the auction allows a tradeoff between performance and computation. Increasing the minimal bid increment can speedup termination and reduce the number of winner determination problems that the auctioneer must solve, although perhaps at the cost of suboptimal bundle allocations.
Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the bundling Agent A B C AB BC AC ABC  1  60 50 0 200   50 60 220  2  0 60 50 60 200 50 220  3  50 0 75 50 75 200 220   Table 1 : Agent v aluations in Problem 1.
problem. Section 3 describes iBundle, and presents a simple best-response agent bidding strategy. In section 4 we demonstrate iBundle on a simple example. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Finally we present our conclusions, and discuss opportunities for further work.
THE BUNDLING PROBLEM
The bundling problem is the problem of allocating items to agents to maximize the sum value across the agents, allowing agents to have non-additive v alues for individual items. For example, consider a factory-scheduling problem with agents that require labor and machine time, where receiving one without the other has no value. The optimal solution will allocate bundles of labor and machine time to agents to maximize the value of the complete schedule, for example minimizing the total cost of delay in completing the jobs of all agents. Problem 1 Table 1 introduces a problem that we will refer back to later in the paper. 1 There are G = fA; B; Cg items to allocate to I = f1; 2; 3g agents. The table lists allocation that maximizes the sum value is indicated with *, and allocates bundle AB to agent 1, and item C to agent 3, for a value V = 275.
In most electronic commerce domains agents will be selfinterested, and will not reveal truthful values for bundles to the auctioneer unless they have an incentive to do so. The market-based approach to the bundling problem is to prices items to provide incentives for agents to demand items that are part of the optimal allocation. In this paper, as is common in the auction literature, we assume that agents are risk-neutral with utility functions that are quasi-linear in money. Given value viS for bundle S, and price pS, agent i has utility uiS = viS,pS for the bundle. Prices support an allocation when every agent receives a bundle that maximizes its utility, given the prices.
There are often no prices on individual items that support an optimal allocation, with prices on a bundle equal to the sum of the price of its constituent items. It is simple to prove this for Problem 1 see Bykowsky et al. 1995 8 . However, there are always bundle prices that support the optimal allocation 26 , where the price of a bundle does not need to be equal to the sum of the price of its constituent items. For example, prices pAB = 150 and pC = 60 with high enough prices on the other bundles support the optimal allocation in Problem 1. Furthermore, when prices are competitive equilibrium CE prices the allocation is optimal 6 . 2 Intuitively, for prices to be CE they must support an allocation that both maximizes agents' utilities and the 1 The problem is derived from a problem in Bykowsky et al. 8 . 2 Possible competitive equilibrium bundle prices in this example are p = f45; 60; 65; 185; 200; 190; 220g. auctioneer's revenue. In some problems the CE prices are discriminatory, with a di erent price for the same bundle to di erent agents 6 .
Within this framework, one useful approach to auction design is to try to compute CE prices from bids from selfinterested agents. We h a ve proved 14 that iBundle generates CE prices for agents that follow a m yopic best-response bidding strategy. Agents will behave autonomously in an open system such as the Internet, with behaviors designed and implemented by di erent companies. However, it is often useful to show that auctions can perform well with simple and reasonable agent bidding strategies for example best-response, because complex agent decision problems can limit the performance of electronic markets 16 .
THE iBUNDLE AUCTION
iBundle is an ascending-price bundle auction, that announces new bundle prices and provisional allocations at the end of each round, and allows agents to bid for bundles. The auctioneer announces ask prices. The bid price is the price that an agent bids for a bundle, and the price an agent must pay if it wins the bundle. In general the ask prices are lower bounds on acceptable bid prices although see discount rules in section 3.1.2. Agents can place additive-or OR and exclusive-or XOR bids for bundles. For example, a bid S1; P 1 O R S2; P 2, indicates that an agent w ants one or both of bundles S1; S 2 at prices P1 and P2; while a bid S1; P 1 X ORS2; P 2 indicates that an agent w ants at most one of bundles S1 and S2. Although every OR bid can be represented as an equivalent X OR bid that lists every combination of bundles explicitly, OR bids allow more e cient bid representations for agents that have naturally additive values. iBundle can also use a more e cient price-update rule for OR bids than XOR bids, generating less explicit bundle prices, and increasing prices more quickly see section 3.1.3.
There are three basic variations of iBundle: iBundle2 generates anonymous ask prices same to every agent; iBundle3 generates discriminatory ask prices possibly different for each agent; and iBundled switches from anonymous to discriminatory prices dynamically, agent-by-agent, to support e cient allocations. 3 Price discrimination enables iBundle to generate e cient allocations in all problem instances. However, discriminatory prices can be more di cult to enforce than anonymous prices see section 3.2, and iBundled may be preferred to iBundle3 when e cient allocations are required but price discrimination should be avoided when possible. In fact, we show empirically that iBundle2 often performs well, and that the increase in e ciency from discriminatory prices is often only measurable at very small bid increments.
Auction Description
We n o w describe the auction in detail. The components of iBundle that are common to all variations are bidding, winner determination, and termination. The price-update rules di er across variations. The auction proceeds in rounds.
We will describe a preprocessing step that converts every OR bid received by the auctioneer into an equivalent set of XOR bids. With this, we describe the winner determination, termination, and price-update rules for an auction that receives only XOR bids. Let G be the set of items to be auctioned, and let I be the set of agents.
Announce Prices and All o cation
At the start of round t, the auctioneer announces new prices for a subset of bundles. The ask prices are initially zero for every bundle unless the seller has a reservation price. The auctioneer only needs to announce a minimal" set of new prices, because the price of every bundle is implicitly at least the maximum price of the bundles that it contains 4 and never decreases between rounds. For example, if the ask price of bundle AB increases to $5, it is not necessary to announce that the price of bundle ABC is also increased to $5. Let p t i S denote the ask price for bundle S to agent i at the start of round t. In general, the ask price for bundle S might not be the same for every agent. The method to compute new prices is described in section 3.1.6.
The auctioneer also announces a provisional allocation of bundles to agents at the start of each round. No agents receive any bundles in the initial allocation. Let t = f i; S j i 2 I ; S Gg represent an allocation of bundles t i = fS j i; S 2 t g to agent i at the start of round t. For example, = f 1; A B ; 3; C g, indicates that agent 1 is allocated bundle AB and agent 3 is allocated item C.
The method to compute the new allocation is described in section 3.1.4.
Bidding
In each round an agent can submit either an XOR or an OR bid for a set of bundles. For example: B XOR i = fS1; P 1; S2; P 2g, indicates an XOR bid for bundles S1 and S2 at prices P1 and P2 respectively; and B OR i = fS1; P 1; S2; P 2g, indicates an OR bid for bundles S1 and S2. Agents must repeat bids for every bundle that they receive in the current allocation, as part of an OR bid if they are currently allocated more than one bundle. Agents cannot submit both XOR and OR bids in the same round.
In general, any bid for a bundle with a bid price below the ask price is invalid, and ignored by the auctioneer. There are two exceptions. First, an agent that is repeating a bid for a bundle that it receives in the current allocation may repeat the bid for the same price, even if the ask price has increased. This rule ensures that the auctioneer receives monotonically increasing revenue in each round of the auction, and motivates agents to place credible bids because decommitment from an allocation is only possible when the auctioneer receives bids that generate more revenue, and not arbitrarily. Second, an agent can take a n -discount" on the ask price of any bundle in any round. However, the auctioneer can detect this discount, and once an agent takes this discount it is forbidden from bidding for the bundle if the ask price ever increases in future rounds. This rule is designed to allow an agent to continue to bid for bundles that are priced just above its value, perhaps as the result of a previous unsuccessful bid from the same agent at a price just below its value. 4 Bundle S1 contains bundle S2 if S2 S1.
Preprocessing
At the end of every round the auctioneer rst transforms every OR bid into a set of equivalent X OR bids. Given a bid S1; P 1 O R S2; P 2 w e create two new dummy agents that each bid one of the original bundles as an XOR bid. From the agent's perspective the new XOR bids are equivalent to the original OR bid. 5 The winner determination, price update, and termination rules are all executed as though the dummy agents are real agents that have placed bids. The transformation is reversed before announcing new prices and allocations to the real agents.
Winner Determination
Then the auctioneer solves the winner determination problem, computing an allocation of bundles to agents that maximizes revenue. The auctioneer rst rejects bids from agents with invalid bid prices, and checks that agents repeat bids for bundles received in the current allocation. The new provisional allocation t+1 solves: The auctioneer breaks ties in favor of assigning bundles to more agents, and then at random except when the same bids are received in two successive auction rounds, when the auctioneer selects the same allocation as before and the auction terminates.
Termination
The auction terminates when one of two simple rules hold, designed to detect quiescence. The auctioneer then imple-ments the nal allocation and sells bundles to agents for the prices that they bid. The auction terminates when either: T1 All agents that bid are happy, o r T2 All agents submit the same bids in successive rounds.
where an agent i s happy at the end of round t when it receives one of the bundles for which it placed an XOR bid. 6 Condition T1 implies quiescence for myopic bestresponse agents, because no agent will increase its bids on any bundle in the future, the current allocation will continue to maximize the auctioneer's revenue, and ask prices will not increase because agents will remain happy. 7 Condition T2 is a little stronger, and implies quiescence for agents that compute bids deterministically, based on ask prices and the current allocation. 8 Unchanged prices between rounds are not su cient to imply quiescence unless the allocation also remains unchanged.
Price Update
Finally, when the auction does not terminate, the auctioneer updates prices. The price-update rule depends on the auction variation. Prices in iBundle2 are anonymous. The ask price pS is increased based on bids received from agents that are not happy i.e. receive no bundle in the current allocation. The ask price increases when the maximum rejected bid price for the bundle from an unhappy agent is within the minimal bid increment of the current ask where unhappy is the set of agents that are not happy with the new provisional allocation. 9 Prices in iBundle3 are discriminatory, there is a set of ask prices for every agent. Price increases to each agent are based only on bids received from that agent. Prices only increase when an agent or one of its dummy agents when it placed an OR bid is unhappy, and then only when the agent bid at within of the current ask price i.e. did not take a discount. The new ask price p t+1 i S to agent i for bundle S is computed as: p t+1 i S = max , p t i S; P i 0 2unhappyi S + 5 6 By extension, an agent that placed an OR bid is happy" only when it receives all the bundles in its bid. This is when the dummy agents for that agent are all happy. 7 This rule is also a useful disincentive against strategic bidding, because it does not allow an agent to place a new bid if a bid is accepted and every other agent is happy. 8 For example, suppose that agents submit the same bids in rounds 9 and 10. The prices at the start of round 10 are computed on the basis of the allocation selected, and the bids placed. Agents submit the same bids in round 10 as in round 9, and the auctioneer computes the same allocation and announces the same prices at the start of round 11. Agents with deterministic bid strategies will place the same bids in round 11 as in round 10, and we h a ve quiescence. 9 Notice that when an agent submits an OR bid the price is increased to above the bid price for all bundles that the agent i s n o t allocated, because the corresponding dummy agents are not happy.
where unhappyi is the set of dummy agents for agent i that are not happy i.e. agent i when agent i placed an XOR bid and received no bundle, or a dummy agent for every bundle that agent i did not receive when agent i placed an OR bid.
Prices in iBundled are initially anonymous, but can become discriminatory during the auction. The auction maintains a set anont of agents that receive anonymous prices in round t, initially containing all agents. The price update rule for the anonymous prices is the same as for iBundle2, except that only bids from agents that continue to receive anonymous prices are considered. The price update rule for the agents that receive discriminatory prices is the same as for iBundle3.
A simple test determines whether to start charging an agent discriminatory prices. Once an agent starts to receive discriminatory prices it does in all future rounds. The auctioneer tests whether prices are increased on at least two disjoint bundles as a result of a single agent's bid this rules out OR bids, because each dummy agent only bids for a single bundle, and agents that are happy. Let incrit be the set of bundles that will increase in price because of the bids placed by agent i, i.e. incrit = fS j S 2 B XOR i ; PiS + p t Sg. Agent i starts to receive discriminatory prices if incrit contains at least two disjoint bundles. The agent is removed from the set anont+1, and its prices are initialized to the current anonymous prices, p t i S = p t S, before they are updated.
Enforcing Non-linear and Discriminatory Prices
All variations of iBundle can generate non-linear prices for items, for example pS1 S2 p S1 + pS2 subadditive prices and pS1 S2 p S1 + pS2 superadditive prices on disjoint bundles S1 and S2. Non-linear prices are often necessary to support e cient solutions. An auctioneer may need to enforce non-linear pricing. Without enforcement an arbitrageur can try to pro t from subadditive prices by purchasing bundles to be disassembled" and sold to agents, or a bidding cartel of agents can form to take advantage of bundle discounts. Similarly, a single agent can try to avoid paying premiums on bundles by entering the auction under multiple pseudonyms and purchasing smaller bundles for assembly" after purchase. The variations of iBundle that use discriminatory prices require that agents cannot enter an auction under multiple pseudonyms to avoid price discrimination. Methods of enforcement include: 1 prevent the transfer of items between agents e.g. the airline industry; 2 prevent agents from entering an auction under multiple pseudonyms, for example through cryptographic message authentication and signature techniques 22 ; 3 reduce opportunities for aftermarkets.
A Best-response Agent Bidding Strategy
We present a simple and reasonable bidding strategy for an agent in iBundle. The bidding strategy is a myopic bestresponse to the current state of the auction prices and allocation. The strategy is not optimal in a game-theoretic sense, and deviations could increase an agent's utility in some auction scenarios. We do not consider agents with information about the other agents, that might place jump bids or bid for less bundles to change the outcome of the auction in their favor. Agents with additive v aluations over bundles can follow a best-response bidding strategy that places OR bids, while agents with general valuation functions, such as the agents in Problem 1 Table 1 , can follow a best-response bidding strategy that places XOR bids.
XOR-bids A best-response bidding strategy for agent i, given values viS and ask prices piS is to place an XOR bid, B XOR i , for every bundle that has non-negative utility and is within of maximizing utility w e assume indi erence within , the minimal bid increment: where PiS is the bid price for bundle S. The agent bids as low a price as possible without limiting its bids in future rounds. Therefore, the bid price is equal to the ask price, except when the agent is repeating a bid from the current allocation when it repeats the same bid price, or when the ask price is greater than the agent's value for the bundle when it considers a bid price -discounted from the ask price. Both of these discounts from the ask price are consistent with the bidding rules of the auction see section 3.1.2. 10 The bidding strategy is a myopic best-response strategy to the current allocation and ask prices. 11 Agents only bid for bundles that maximize their utility, and maximize the probability that one of those bundles will be in the tentative allocation announced at the end of the round by providing the auctioneer with as large a choice set as possible. If a bid is unsuccessful at the lowest possible price then agents get another chance to bid, because termination rule T1 requires that every agent is happy. The bidding strategy is also safe 13 , agents get bundles that are nearly optimal relative to their valuations at the nal prices and never risk losing utility. Agents avoid the exposure problem 8 .
OR-bids Agents that have v aluation functions that are
naturally additive o ver bundles, e.g. vS1 S2 = vS1 + vS2 for all disjoint bundles S1 and S2 for which the agent has positive value, can submit OR bids. A best-response strategy is to bid for all bundles with positive utility a t t h e current prices:
where PiS the bid price is discounted from the ask price in the same cases as for the XOR-bidding strategy. This is a best-response strategy for an agent with additive v alue for each bundle because the agent bids for as many bundles with positive utility as possible, at the lowest prices possible. 12 10 This strategy automatically bids for a bundle S that an agent receives in the current allocation, because the agent can bid the same price, the price of other bundles has not decreased, and the bundle was in the set of utility maximizing bundles in the previous round. 11 The strategy also has a no-regret property in the sense that an agent does not want t o c hange its bid whatever the immediate bids of other agents. 12 This strategy may seem suboptimal in the case that the ask price for superbundle" S1 S2 is less than the total ask price for bundles S1 and S2. H o wever, an agent m ust repeat its bid for any bundle in the current allocation, and the auctioneer will only select a bid for bundle S1 S2 when the bid price is at least as great as the sum of the bid prices for S1 and S2.
WORKED EXAMPLE
In this section we present a w orked example of iBundle2 and iBundle3 on Problem 1. In this example discriminatory prices are unnecessary to generate an e cient allocation, and iBundled is identical to iBundle2. Table  2 records the prices, bids, and allocation in each round of iBundle2 for agents that place best-response XOR bids, with a bid increment = 30. For each round t the table records the ask prices at the start of the round, p t S, the bids placed by the agents, and the allocation at the end of the round, t+1 . The bids that maximize revenue solve the winner determination problem in each round are indicated with *. We will look at round 4 in more detail. Agent 1 w as allocated bundle ABC at the end of round 3. In round 4 agent 1 re-bids ABC; 60 for the same bid price as in round 3, and also bids AB; 30. The reader can check that these bids maximize the agent's utility given the ask prices to within . The auction terminates at the end of round 15 by rule T2 , and the provisional allocation 16 = f 1; A B ; 3; C g becomes the nal allocation. Bundle AB is sold to agent 1 for pAB = 180 and bundle C is sold to agent 3 for pC = 60. These are approximate CE prices for the problem see section 2. Table 3 records the progress of iBundle3 on Problem 1. The minimal bid increment is unchanged, = 30. For each round t the table records the ask price, p t i S, for each agent, the bids placed by each agent blank entries indicate that no bids are received, and the new provisional allocation, t+1 . The winning bids are indicated with *.
The prices to agents are increased in rounds where they bid but are allocated no bundle. For example, at the end of round 4 agent 1 is in the provisional allocation, and has the same prices at the start of round 5; while the prices for BCand ABC increase for agent 2, and the prices for AC and ABC increase for agent 3 . The auction terminates at the end of round 14 by rule T2 , and bundle AB is sold to agent 1 for p1AB = 180, bundle C to agent 3 for p3C = 60. This is the same outcome as for iBundle2.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
Initial results from an empirical study of the performance of iBundle on several hard bundling problems provide empirical support for the theoretical e ciency of iBundle. We simulated agents that follow the best-response bidding strategies described in section 3.3. Typical measures of auction performance include allocative e ciency and revenue. We also measured the correctness" of allocations, the average number of times that an auction nds the optimal allocation. This is often a more sensitive measure of performance than e ciency although with less economic relevance.
In presenting the empirical results for iBundle we h a ve a dilemma, because iBundled and iBundle3 provably generate 100 e cient and correct allocations for a small enough bid increment and best-response agent bidding strategies 14 . What we show is that iBundle continues to perform well with quite large bid increments, and that iBundle2 without price discrimination will often perform as well as iBundled and iBundle3.
E ciency Allocative e ciency, e , is measured as the ratio of the value of the nal allocation to the value V of the optimal allocation that maximizes total value across the agents: in recognition that an auctioneer cannot expect to sell goods for more than agents value them, at least in the long run. iBundle will often terminate before agents have revealed or computed complete information about their values for bundles. We de ne information revelation, inf , designed to measure the extent to which an agent has revealed its value for each bundle to the auctioneer during the auction. This does not necessarily correspond to computational savings. where P max i S is the maximum bid from agent i for bundle S during the auction; Bidi is the set of bundles that receive bids from agent i; and Val funi is the set of bundles with positive value in agent i's valuation function. 13 The overall auction information revelation, inf , is computed as the average information revelation over all agents.
Information Revelation

Problem Sets
We tested iBundle on several problem sets from the literature. The problem set characteristics are summarized in Table 4. The CalTech problem set 11 is designed to represent a hard spatial tting problem, and has been used to test the AUSM and RAD bundle auctions 9 . Problem sets PS1 and PS2 are resource allocation problems that have been used to test the performance of a sequential auction mechanism SEQ with adaptive agent bidding strategies 7 . Problem sets 9-16 are generated from bid distributions used to test a new winner determination algorithm for bundle auctions 21 . 14 We designed problem sets 4-8 to represent di erent 13 When an agent has a naturally additive v aluation function, we use the set of seed" bundles with positive v alue, not all additive combinations. 14 We generated agent v aluation functions by partitioning the bid distributions across the agents. In problem sets 9-12 we give agents XOR values over the bundles, in problem sets [13] [14] [15] [16] levels of subadditivity and superadditivity o ver items. 15 We refer to these problem sets as k-compg. Agents have subadditive v alues for combinations of items when k 1, and superadditive v alues when k 1. The parameter g indicates how many items are covered by bundles with positive v alue in each agent's valuation function. Table 4 states the number of items jGj in each problem set, the number of agents jIj, the average number of bundles with positive v alue for each agent, and whether the agents have O R o r X OR values over bundles. Table 4 also records the average percentage of agents in the optimal allocation. All other things being equal, we would expect a greater proportion of agents to receive bundles as the number of items increases, the number of agents decreases, and the level of superadditivity decreases. For example, the number of agents in the optimal solution falls as k increases in the k-comp problem sets 4 8. We also computed the performance of a naive central algorithm naive for each problem set, to provide a baseline for the performance of the auctionbased solutions. The naive algorithm repeatedly selects an agent at random without replacement and tries to allocate bundles to the agent u n til it is happy, c hoosing bundles in order of decreasing value.
Comparison Auction Mechanisms
We compared the performance of iBundle with reported results for other auctions. AUSM and RAD are iterative auctions that allow agents to bid for bundles 11, 9 , and SEQ is a sequential auction for items with agents that have adaptive bidding strategies 7 . We also implemented a simple simultaneous ascending price auction, with and without bid withdrawal SAA-w and SAA, 16 and best-response agent bidding strategies. 17 15 Thanks to Peter Wurman for providing the initial idea for these problem sets. 16 In SAA-w agents can withdraw a bid in any round. When an agent withdraws a bid the ask price is set to the price P of the bid withdrawn. If the item remains unsold the agent m ust pay penalty P.
This approximates the rule used in the FCC spectrum auction 17 . 17 In SAA agents bid for items that maximize utility, assuming they will win every bid 24 . Without budget constraints agents writeo incomplete bundles with this strategy, in a phenomena described by Bykowsky et al. as mutually destructive bidding 8 . The bestresponse strategy in SAA-w is similar, except that agents assume that they can decommit for free. Once an agent has withdrawn a bid, the penalty represents a sunk cost. There is continued debate about the 
Experimental Results
We implemented iBundle, SAA and SAA-w in C++. A branch-and-bound depth-rst search is used to solve the auctioneer's winner determination problem in each round 21 . Modules to generate random problem sets, and simulate agent bidding strategies were also coded in C++.
We normalized the minimal bid increment in the iterative auctions SAA, SAA-w and iBundle, to give some consistency across problem sets and between single-item auctions and bundle auctions. We adjusted the minimal bid increment according to the e ect of a price increase on the utility of an agent in the nal allocation. 18 We report results for bid increments of 20 and 5.
First, we compared the performance of iBundle2 with reported results for AUSM and RAD 9, 11 on problem set 1 Table 5 . The experiments reported in DeMartini et al. 9 are with human participants, and it is possible that software agents could perform better or worse. This aside, iBundle2 achieves a higher e ciency than RAD and AUSM, and is competitive in revenue. We also compared the performance of iBundle with SEQ 7 on problem sets 2 and 3. iBundle2 generates almost perfect allocations, signicantly outperforming SEQ results on corr and rev are not available for SEQ. The empirical results reported for SEQ are with agents that follow sophisticated bidding strategies, learned over many repeated trials of the same problem instance. In comparison, iBundle agents follow simple bestresponse bidding strategies. Figure 1 plots the e ciency a and correctness b of iBundle2 and SAA-w with = 5 for each problem set, together with the naive performance as a baseline. The SAA auction fails in many problem sets 1, 3, 8, 10 16 , in the sense that agents lose utility through participation when the best-response bidding strategy leaves them with incomplete bundles. 19 SAA-w allows bid withdrawal, and mitigates the exposure problem in problem sets 12 and 13. For the sake of analysis we substitute the e ciency and correctness of naive, and the revenue from the Generalized Vickrey Auction GVA, in problem sets where SAA and SAA-w fail. 20 e ect of bid withdrawal on auction performance 8, 18 . 18 The actual increment is set so that the e ect of a price increase on every bundle in an agent's nal allocation is approximately equal to of the average value. 19 The e ciency of an allocation is irrelevant if it is generated with bidding strategies that lead to utility loss, because we cannot expect agents to follow bad bidding strategies in the long term. 20 The naive central algorithm provides a useful lower bound on eciency and correctness, but revenue is unde ned. The GVA provides a l o wer bound on revenue, for agents that follow rational bidding strategies in an auction that generates e cient solutions. Figure 2 compares the eciency and correctness with each auction variation for problem set 0.5-comp3. Although price discrimination is required for 100 correctness in this problem, the e ciency improvement i s negligible. Furthermore, price discrimination only makes a di erence for very small bid increments, when the communication cost begins to increase rapidly. The results show that iBundle can tradeo performance for communication, computation, and information revelation costs. iBundle2 achieves allocations that average 91.7 e ciency across all problem sets and terminates after 5.7 rounds with bid increment = 20, down from 99 e ciency after 18 rounds with bid increment = 5. We can see the tradeo for problem 0.5-comp3 in Figure 2 .
Finally, iBundle2 requires an average of 57.5 information revelation at = 20 when the allocations are 91.7 e cient, and an average of 71 information revelation at = 5 when the allocations are 99 e cient. The sealed-bid GVA requires 100 information revelation from agents to achieve 100 e ciency. Information reve- lation may be smaller in real problems, because we provide agents with sparse valuation functions in the rst place this limits the size of the denominator in eq. 10.
DISCUSSION
The prices in iBundle are ascending, and updated on the basis of bids from agents that are not accepted in the current round of the auction. Intuitively, when an agent's bid price PS for bundle S is rejected, and the agent is allocated no bundle, then the bid price is a lower bound on the price than any agent m ust bid to receive the bundle assuming the auctioneer receives at least the same bids for the bundles in the current allocation in the next round.
It is hard to provide further intuition for the idiosyncrasies of the price rules e.g. the -discount and the rule for price discrimination without an accompanying theoretical analysis see 14 . The basic idea is to increase prices until every agent that bids is happy with its allocation, while supporting bids from agents that allow the auctioneer to maximize its revenue at the current prices in every round. Increasing prices on the basis of losing bids, together with the bid discount rules, and the decision to sometimes charge discriminatory prices, all work together to enable this. 21 With a small enough bid increment w e h a ve proved that iBundle terminates with competitive equilibrium CE bundle prices that support an optimal allocation 14 . Price discrimination is sometimes necessary for optimality, but practically seems to have only a marginal e ect on performance.
The termination rules could be relaxed for boundedrational agents that can make mistakes in the bids that they place, because of auction time constraints and the complexity of local valuation problems. For example, we could run the auction without T1 and with T2 applied to several consecutive rounds, to allow agents to change an allocation by placing new bids. However, both of these changes may 21 iBundle reduces to the English auction for agents that do not make jump bids, sometimes called the Japanese auction for a single item. The price in the auction is increased whenever more than one agent bids for the item at the current ask price, and the auction terminates when one agent remains in the auction. increase agents' ability to bid strategically and deviate from best-response strategies.
Related bundle auctions have been proposed in recent years, including AUSM 3 and Ascending k-Bundle Auction AkBA 25, chapter5 . AUSM does not generate ask prices for bundles and requires complex agent bidding strategies, for which theoretical analysis is very di cult 8, 13 . AkBA is a family of auctions that are similar to iBundle, but use a linear program to update prices, and never charge discriminatory prices. A1BA, thought to be the most promising of the family, is not believed to support optimal allocations in all problems for any simple agent behavior. RAD 9 is an iterative auction that allows bids for bundles of items, but does not support non-linear bundle prices.
CONCLUSIONS
We h a ve presented results on the performance of iBundle, a new iterative bundle auction. iBundle generates e cient solutions in a reasonable number of rounds with a bestresponse agent bidding strategy. Initial analysis suggests that iBundle continues to perform well without price discrimination, on the basis of bundle prices alone. We believe that its ability to tradeo allocative e ciency for computation and communication cost will be important in practical applications.
Iterative auctions can allow more e cient computation than sealed-bid auctions when agents have hard valuation problems, and this can lead to higher allocative e ciency 15 . iBundle can generate solutions without information from agents on their value for every bundle. Agents only need to determine the bundles that maximize utility given prices to be able follow a best-response bidding strategy, and this can be done with approximate values for bundles.
Although iBundle can leverage new algorithms for the winner-determination problem 10, 21 , the fundamental complexity o f the bundling problem remains the auctioneer's problem is N P -complete. One future direction is to introduce an approximation algorithm for this problem, and study the e ect on the bidding strategies of agents and the performance of the auction. Another approach is to look for useful decompositions of the bundling problem, and apply reduced-scope bundle or other auctions to parts of the resource space.
There are several other possible extensions to this work. These include investigating the e ect of jump bids and strategic bidding behavior on performance. A particular goal is to understand the extent to which iBundle addresses the free-riding or threshold problem 8, 13 . We plan to apply iBundle to a real e-commerce problem domain, and extend the auction to environments with multiple sellers. 
